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 Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant? 
ADAM WINKLER 
I.  
It seems beyond question that the Second Amendment has never been more im-
portant in constitutional law. In the past decade, the Supreme Court for the first time 
held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual’s right to have handguns 
in the home in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 The Court subsequently expanded the 
protection for private gun ownership in McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 incorporating 
the right to keep and bear arms to the states. The Second Amendment has been even 
livelier in the lower federal courts, which have decided hundreds of gun rights cases 
since Heller dealing with nearly every type of gun law on the books.  
Nevertheless, if we think about the future of the Second Amendment, it may soon 
become largely irrelevant. That is not to say that Heller will be overturned or that the 
amendment will become less important as a rhetorical theme in debates over gun 
policy. The opposite appears true; Heller is secure as a precedent and gun law oppo-
nents continue to invoke the Second Amendment frequently, and with considerable 
success, on the floors of statehouses nationwide. With the National Rifle Association 
(NRA) one of the nation’s leading political players and gun advocates in control of 
Congress, the White House, and the majority of state legislatures, the Second 
Amendment continues to have tremendous cultural and political significance. The 
Second Amendment, however, may become increasingly irrelevant in one of the 
most fundamental ways that matter to a constitutional provision: distinguishing law-
ful polices from unlawful ones. This sorting function is where the proverbial rubber 
hits the road in constitutional analysis.3  
Why might the Second Amendment cease to serve this vital constitutional func-
tion? The explanation begins with the difference between how the Second 
Amendment is invoked in political debates and how the amendment is invoked in 
court. There are, it seems, two Second Amendments. There is a Judicial Second 
Amendment comprised of court decisions interpreting the provision, and there is an 
Aspirational Second Amendment that is used in political dialogue. These two ver-
sions of the Second Amendment are different; the aspirational one is far more hostile 
to gun laws than the judicial one.  
Moreover, the Aspirational Second Amendment is overtaking the Judicial Second 
Amendment in American law. In the vast majority of states, the gun laws that people 
live with are largely a product of the Aspirational Second Amendment as it has been 
articulated by gun advocates and elected lawmakers. Ironically, the same political 
forces that led to the reinvigoration of the Second Amendment and the Heller 
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decision are also helping to sap the Judicial Second Amendment of its role in 
separating out good laws from bad ones. This is a sign of gun advocates’ political 
success, not political failure: state law is embracing such a robust, anti-regulatory 
view of the right to keep and bear arms that the Judicial Second Amendment, at least 
as currently construed, seems likely to have less and less to say about the shape of 
America’s gun laws.  
Of course, the future is unpredictable. And in the paradoxical world of guns, the 
amendment that seems increasingly irrelevant could alternatively be transformed in 
the opposite direction to become far more significant in American law than the 
Second Amendment—or any state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to 
bear arms—has ever been.  
II. 
When an issue of public policy arises with constitutional implications, the tradi-
tional analysis of lawyers about the policy’s constitutionality will turn on how the 
underlying constitutional provision has been construed by the courts. For instance, 
when someone suggests banning hate speech a typical response might be to say, “But 
the First Amendment does not allow that. The courts have held there is no exception 
for hate speech.” This is an argument based on how the First Amendment is inter-
preted and applied by the courts. Given the judicial doctrine on free speech, a law 
punishing hate speech would be unconstitutional. Reference to court decisions is not 
the only way to make a sound constitutional argument, although it is perhaps the 
most common way.  
If we were to ask a similar question about the constitutionality of a gun law, we 
might well look to the Judicial Second Amendment for the answer. This version of 
the Second Amendment is determined by Supreme Court decisions like Heller, 
McDonald, and, more recently, Caetano v. Massachusetts. In June 2016, the Court 
unanimously reversed a state supreme court decision holding stun guns were not 
arms protected by the Second Amendment.4 The Court’s per curiam opinion in 
Caetano, which included the justices who dissented in Heller and McDonald, unam-
biguously endorsed Heller, made clear that arms other than handguns were protected 
by the amendment, and returned the case to the state court for appropriate reconsid-
eration. The decision signals that Heller is secure as a precedent.5  
Under the Supreme Court’s decisions, the Second Amendment guarantees indi-
viduals the right to have handguns in the home for self-defense. That right applies 
against both state and federal governments, and it protects access to at least some 
arms other than handguns.6 Heller suggested also, without affirmatively deciding, 
that a number of gun laws did not run afoul of the Second Amendment. In a signifi-
cant paragraph, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion indicated that the Second 
Amendment did not call into question bans on possession by felons and the mentally 
ill, restrictions on guns in sensitive places like schools and government buildings, 
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and laws regulating the commercial sale of firearms. The Court also observed that 
while bearing arms is not restricted to military use, complete prohibitions on con-
cealed carry had been upheld in some circumstances. “[T]he right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited,” Scalia wrote.7  
The Judicial Second Amendment is also given shape by lower court decisions, 
such as the rulings of the federal courts of appeals on issues the Supreme Court has 
yet to decide. Heller and McDonald spurred a tremendous amount of litigation over 
gun laws in states across the nation. As a result, the federal circuits have decided 
Second Amendment cases on a wide variety of issues. Yet there has been remarkable 
uniformity of results.8 The courts have gravitated towards an intermediate form of 
scrutiny that requires laws burdening activity protected by the amendment to be subs-
tantially related to important government interests.9 Applying this standard, the cir-
cuit courts have upheld a wide variety of laws, including three that are at the center 
of the current gun debate: discretionary permitting for concealed carry,10 bans on 
military-style assault weapons,11 and restrictions on high-capacity magazines.12 
Although the lower courts have consistently upheld the federal law prohibiting 
felons and the mentally ill from possessing firearms as against facial challenges,13 
some courts have held that particular individuals subject to the ban can bring as-
applied challenges.14 If convicted of a nonviolent offense a long time ago or adjudi-
cated mentally ill in an isolated, stale incident, a person might be able to win 
restoration of her gun rights. Although as-applied challenges are commonplace in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010))). 
 10. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879–80; Drake 
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d 
Cir. 2012). But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidating 
the District of Columbia’s discretionary permitting law). 
 11. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 
406 (7th Cir. 2015); Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015); Heller v. 
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 137; Friedman, 784 F.3d at 411–12; Fyock, 779 F.3d at 
996–97.  
 13. See United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281, 282 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (listing 
cases affirming the constitutionality of the restriction from “every other circuit to consider the 
issue”); see also LITIGATION SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that “[b]ecause Heller sug-
gested these ‘presumptively lawful’ regulations fall outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment, most courts have had little trouble upholding them”).  
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). 
256 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:253 
 
constitutional law, in the Second Amendment context they pose unusual challenges. 
There are millions of people subject to these bans, each of whom may be entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing in federal court, putting some considerable strain on already 
overloaded dockets.  
Moreover, there is not an obvious judicially manageable standard for determining 
who should have their rights restored. In a recent case, the Third Circuit suggested 
relief would be appropriate if one can “show that he is no more dangerous than a 
typical law-abiding citizen.”15 That rather abstract question is impossible to answer, 
as it relies on predictions about the future dangerousness of the challenger and com-
parisons to a baseline of dangerousness of the average person that cannot ever be 
known. It also presents quite a burden for prosecutors. Given that those who would 
petition for a hearing would likely have no recent convictions, prosecutors will have 
to conduct time-consuming investigations into the details of a petitioner’s personal 
and work life in a search for signs of dangerousness that are ambiguous at best. And 
already overloaded prosecutors are unlikely to prioritize such investigations over 
those designed to solve recent crimes. 
Despite the as-applied cases, the broader trend in the courts has been to uphold 
most forms of gun control.16 This should come as little surprise. Although the Second 
Amendment case law is new, nearly every state guarantees individuals the right to 
bear arms in its own state constitution and there are nearly two hundred years of case 
law interpreting these provisions. Prior to Heller, state supreme courts across the 
nation read the right to bear arms to permit “reasonable regulation,” which typically 
meant that gun laws were upheld so long as they did not “destroy” or “nullify” the 
right entirely.17 Despite wide demographic and political differences, states before 
Heller were uniform in their use of the reasonable regulation standard for gun laws 
—red states and blue states, north and south, east and west. As under Heller, the 
overwhelming majority of gun laws survived judicial scrutiny.18  
Although the jurisprudential results of a reinvigorated Second Amendment were 
predictably similar to the outcomes seen for decades in state court right-to-bear-arms 
decisions, there have been complaints that the courts have neutered Heller. In a 2013 
filing with the Court, Paul Clement, a well-respected lawyer who was representing 
the NRA, argued that the lower federal courts had engaged in “massive resistance to 
this court’s decisions,” evoking the pushback by southern states to Brown v. Board 
of Education.19 In June 2017, when the Supreme Court declined to hear Peruta v. 
California on the constitutionality of discretionary permitting for concealed carry,20 
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by the Court’s newest member, Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, dissented from the denial of certiorari and argued the courts were treating 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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“the Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”21 Among the evidence: in the pre-
ceding seven years, the Court had not “heard argument” in a single Second 
Amendment case, compared to “roughly 35 cases where the question presented 
turned on the meaning of the First Amendment and 25 cases that turned on the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”22  
Even though Thomas was correct that the Court had not “heard argument” in a 
Second Amendment case, the Justices had nonetheless decided Caetano just the term 
before. One reason the Court has been able to avoid taking more Second Amendment 
cases is that there have not been many significant circuit splits. The best predictor of 
whether the Justices will take a case is the existence of directly contrary decisions by 
the courts of appeals on an issue.23 One of the Court’s primary roles is to ensure a 
measure of uniformity on matters of constitutional law, and when the circuit courts 
are in agreement the justices often stay out of disputes. When the justices considered 
whether to take Peruta, for example, every circuit court to decide the question had 
ultimately ruled that discretionary permitting is permissible under the Second 
Amendment.24 (As this Essay was being published, the D.C. Circuit invalidated a 
discretionary permitting law; that case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.25) A 
similar situation exists with regard to restrictions on military-style assault weapons 
and high-capacity magazines, which have also been upheld by every circuit to rule 
to date.26 There simply is not that much disagreement in the federal courts of appeals 
about the scope of the Judicial Second Amendment.  
Nonetheless, Thomas’s dissent illustrates the frustration among some that Heller 
has not gone further to undermine restrictive gun laws. One source of this grievance 
is the fact that we have two Second Amendments: one in the courts and one in the 
aspirational politics of gun enthusiasts. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch subscribe to a 
broader, expansive vision of the right to keep and bear arms more in tune with the 
Aspirational Second Amendment than the Judicial Second Amendment.  
III. 
The Aspirational Second Amendment is the version of the amendment whose sub-
stance derives primarily from political discourse around guns and the arguments of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Id. at 1999 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a); see also ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHANIE M. 
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the gun rights movement. When a gun law comes up for consideration, the 
Aspirational Second Amendment is the one that the NRA and its allies argue must 
be followed. Yet the Second Amendment they mean is not the Judicial Second 
Amendment; advocates do not focus on the judicial decisions authoritatively inter-
preting the Second Amendment. Rather, they argue that law must comply with a 
version of the Second Amendment that is informed by political advocacy on behalf 
of gun rights.  
The Aspirational Second Amendment is quite different from the Judicial Second 
Amendment. According to gun advocates, the right to keep and bear arms goes much 
further than the current judicial doctrine, requiring more access to guns and prohib-
iting a far greater range of gun laws than the Second Amendment in the courts. Under 
the Aspirational Second Amendment, individuals not only have a right to own 
handguns; they also have a right to military-style assault rifles. High-capacity mag-
azines are also arms protected by the Second Amendment and cannot be banned. 
Individuals have the right to carry weapons in public, either openly or concealed, and 
states can only impose minimal, objective requirements to obtain a permit to carry 
(what is known as “shall-issue” permitting). When carrying their guns in public, peo-
ple have a right under the Aspirational Second Amendment to go nearly anywhere 
there is not specialized security such as schools, bars, and churches.  
A good example of the Aspirational Second Amendment is the recent push by gun 
advocates to eliminate all permitting for concealed carry. In recent years, advocates 
have promoted the idea of “constitutional carry”: the notion that the Second 
Amendment is the only permit a person needs to be able to carry their guns in pub-
lic.27 They explicitly ground this understanding of gun rights in the Constitution, 
even though there has never been an authoritative decision by any federal court (or, 
for that matter, any state or local court) saying that individuals have a right to carry 
firearms in public without a permit. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any court in modern 
society ruling that way. Advocates nonetheless insist that their vision of gun rights 
is based on the Constitution when it is in fact grounded in an idealized vision of what 
the Constitution says.  
It is common for interest groups to have different understandings of constitutional 
values than the courts.28 What makes the Second Amendment unusual is that the 
aspirational version of this right plays a greater role in shaping the law on the ground 
than the judicial version. Because the gun rights movement has been so successful at 
the state level, the gun laws of the overwhelming majority of states—forty-one of 
them as of this writing—by and large reflect the Aspirational Second Amendment. 
Moreover, this movement has also worked to shape federal gun laws to reflect this 
version of the amendment. In recent years, gun advocates have defeated efforts to 
reauthorize the expiring assault weapons ban, expand background checks, and add 
suspected terrorists to a no-buy list for guns. 
 When gun laws are proposed, many lawmakers avoid discussion of the Judicial 
Second Amendment, save perhaps to cite the Heller case. Instead, when deliberating 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See Adam Weinstein, Understanding ‘Constitutional Carry,’ the Gun-Rights 
Movement Sweeping the Country, TRACE (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thetrace.org/2017 
/02/constitutional-carry-gun-rights-movement-explained [https://perma.cc/RY8E-5RML]. 
 28. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016). 
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and debating a proposed gun law, these lawmakers refer instead to the Aspirational 
Second Amendment—the one envisioned by the NRA and gun advocates that is far 
more expansive in its protection for guns. So instead of just arguing that a proposed 
gun law is good or bad in its public policy impact, these lawmakers justify their sup-
port or opposition based on this judicially unmoored understanding of the Second 
Amendment. Standard arguments about the constitutionality of a law based on judi-
cial doctrine are largely brushed aside. It does not matter much what the courts say 
the Second Amendment means.  
Again, the significance of this variation is largely in the law on the ground. 
Because lawmakers subscribing to the Aspirational Second Amendment hold the ma-
jority in most statehouses and now in Congress, it is that version that is gaining rel-
evance. The judicial one, however, is seemingly becoming increasingly irrelevant to 
how the gun laws in most of America work. The gun laws of the majority of states 
have far outpaced judicial doctrine. If the Supreme Court had followed the sugges-
tion of Justices Thomas and Gorsuch and heard Peruta, the outcome of the case 
would not have had any impact on those states, no matter which way the Court ruled. 
If the Court struck down discretionary permitting or upheld it, the ruling would not 
impact states that already have shall-issue or no permitting requirements. The same 
can be said about potential Supreme Court rulings on assault weapons and high-ca-
pacity magazines. Given the strength of the gun rights movement at the state and 
federal level, what the Supreme Court says about the scope of the Second 
Amendment is all but meaningless in much of the country. 
IV. 
There are a handful of states for which the Judicial Second Amendment still mat-
ters. The gun movement has yet to sway nine states—California, New York, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Connecticut, New Jersey, Hawaii, Delaware, and Rhode 
Island—and the District of Columbia, which have not adopted the Aspirational 
Second Amendment. That is not to say that gun rights are nonexistent in these 
holdouts. Under the Judicial Second Amendment they are still required to allow any 
law-abiding person of age to possess firearms in the home for personal protection. 
Even prior to Heller, gun politics were such that there had been no significant push 
to prohibit possession of firearms in the home even in these places in decades. (New 
York City is unusual in that it requires a permit to have any gun in the home.29) Some 
firearms are off limits, and these states and the District of Columbia have moved to 
expand those restrictions recently.  
Yet while the laws of the holdouts have passed muster under the Judicial Second 
Amendment, they would run afoul of the Aspirational Second Amendment. Although 
each of these states and the District of Columbia formally allow people to carry guns 
in public with a permit, they have discretionary permitting that allows a local law 
enforcement officer to decide whether a person has a particular individualized need  
for armed protection in public.30 In practice, this is often equivalent to an effective 
ban on carrying a concealed weapon in public—and in California, where open carry 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See R.C.N.Y, tit. 38, §§ 5-01, 5-02 (2010). 
 30. See Concealed Carry, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (July 22, 2016), 
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is prohibited, it can be a total ban on carrying any firearm.31 Under the Aspirational 
Second Amendment, this type of regime is clearly unconstitutional, but under the 
Judicial Second Amendment, these policies remain permissible. Also found in this 
handful of states are laws restricting the sale or possession of military-style assault 
weapons and high-capacity magazines, waiting periods, and universal background 
checks. All of these laws too would easily pass muster in court—and several have 
consistently been upheld already—but not if measured against the Aspirational 
Second Amendment. 
The gulf between the states in the two competing camps is only becoming larger 
in the wake of the Newtown mass shooting in December 2012. The federal govern-
ment did not pass any new gun legislation after Newtown, despite a strong push 
from President Barack Obama. In the states, however, there has been a tremendous 
amount of legislative activity on guns.32 Among the nine states with stricter gun 
laws, there have been a number of new restrictions enacted. At the same time, many 
of the other forty-one states have passed laws loosening gun possession even 
further, as exemplified by Georgia’s “guns everywhere” law.33 In fact, by one 
count, there have been more laws passed easing gun possession than laws passed 
restricting guns.34 For some in America, Newtown was a warning that we have to 
do more to limit guns; for others, it was proof that limits on guns do not work and 
that more people should be armed.  
Proponents of the Aspirational Second Amendment would like to see their 
vision adopted by the courts, and they have fought to secure such rulings in recent 
years. In the wake of Heller, their success has been limited. Yet they continue to 
find success in the legislative branches. On concealed carry, gun advocates may 
well find in Congress the victory over discretionary permitting the courts have 
denied them. One of the NRA’s highest legislative priorities for the Trump 
administration is a “national reciprocity” law.35 There are two basic reciprocity 
proposals: a tourist version and a resident version. The tourist version would allow 
a person who has a concealed carry permit at home to carry a gun while on the 
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2017), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170609/concealed-carry-reciprocity-effort-gains-
steam-in-congress [https://perma.cc/DJS5-GTQ6]. 
2018] SECOND AMENDMENT BECOMING IRRE LEVANT?  261 
 
road. So a Virginian with a permit who comes to California on vacation can carry 
while on vacation.36  
The resident version of reciprocity would allow a Californian to obtain a permit 
online from Virginia and carry at home in California. Whereas tourist reciprocity 
would lead to some more guns on the street, the resident version would effectively 
gut discretionary permitting. Local residents could easily obtain a permit from a 
shall-issue state—some, like Virginia, do not require an applicant to be a 
resident—and carry on his own city’s streets. The discretionary permitting states 
would become, for all intents and purposes, shall-issue. If resident reciprocity 
passes, the constitutional debate over discretionary permitting becomes largely 
meaningless. Whatever the courts say about discretionary permitting will not 
impact the law on the ground.  
Proponents of the Aspirational Second Amendment are promoting another re-
form that could further marginalize the Judicial Second Amendment: strict scrutiny 
amendments to state constitutional right-to-bear-arms provisions. As mentioned 
earlier, state courts traditionally apply a relatively deferential reasonable regulation 
standard under these state constitutional guarantees. Disappointed with the results, 
gun advocates have won ballot measures in Louisiana and Missouri amending 
those states’ constitutions to require courts to apply strict scrutiny to right to bea r 
arms disputes.37 They are explicitly transforming the right to bear arms in the courts 
to look more like the Aspirational Second Amendment.  
Strict scrutiny ballot initiatives further reduce the on-the-ground import of the 
Judicial Second Amendment. Litigants in the affected states will choose to chal-
lenge state gun laws under state constitutional right-to-bear-arms provisions in-
stead of the Second Amendment because of the former’s more rigorous standard 
of review. Strict scrutiny should mean that more of those challenges succeed than 
they would under Heller—at least in theory38—so lawyers will direct litigation into 
the state courts. The overall impact of these ballot measures, however, is limited 
in that they do not apply to federal laws and are most likely to be adopted in states 
whose laws already reflect the permissiveness of the Aspirational Second 
Amendment.  
V. 
While the gap between the Judicial Second Amendment and the Aspirational 
Second Amendment grows, the strict scrutiny initiatives nevertheless remind us 
how political movements reshape constitutional doctrine in the courts. Scholars 
have long described how our fundamental rights are shaped by nonjudicial actors, 
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such as Congress, presidents, state legislators, interest groups, and common citi-
zens.39 There may be no better example than the Second Amendment.40 
When Heller came down, it was heralded as the “triumph of originalism” because 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion purported to base the decision on the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment.41 Yet, Heller was also a reflection of how pop-
ular movements can change constitutional law. For most of American history, the 
ambiguity of the Second Amendment’s text was sufficient to raise questions about 
the scope and nature of the right. While lawyers sometimes claimed the Second 
Amendment protected an individual right—consider Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
statement in Dred Scott v. Sandford that citizenship for African Americans would 
extend to them the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they went”42—the federal 
courts since the 1930s had adopted a militia-centered view.43 For years, not even the 
NRA promoted the individual-rights view of the Second Amendment.44 In the 1930s, 
NRA president Karl Frederick wrote that “enlightened public sentiment” and “intel-
ligent legislative action” gave protection to individuals’ access to guns in the home: 
“It is not to be found in the Constitution.”45  
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, however, a vigorous and active social move-
ment arose that breathed new life into the Second Amendment. In an era of rising 
crime rates and growing disenchantment with government’s ability to solve social 
problems, many Americans began to view access to guns for self-defense as a fun-
damental right.46 This shift was reflected in the transformation of the NRA. The or-
ganization had supported the ultimate passage of the federal laws known as the Gun 
Control Act of 1968—which restricted who could purchase a gun, barred the impor-
tation of certain firearms, and created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
to enforce federal gun laws47—and the leaders of the organization supported a variety 
of gun safety measures, including waiting periods and restrictive licensing for con-
cealed carry.48 Seeking to withdraw from gun politics, the NRA’s leaders even 
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planned to close up the Washington office, move headquarters to Colorado, and focus 
on hunting. A group of dissident members who thought guns were not for shooting 
ducks but for self-protection against criminals took over the NRA, rededicating it to 
waging political battle against gun laws. The new leadership subscribed to a vibrant 
and expansive Second Amendment far greater in its constitutional protection than 
that offered by judicial doctrine.49  
Although Heller is perhaps the most high-profile illustration of the NRA’s success 
in furthering its vision, the most significant thing the transformed NRA did for the 
past forty years was to adopt a political rather than litigation strategy for protecting 
the right to bear arms. Although active today in court, prior to the Heller case the 
NRA did not focus on trying to persuade judges of its view of the Second 
Amendment. Instead of pursuing litigation, the NRA focused its efforts on mobiliz-
ing citizens, especially gun owners, and electing officials who could repeal restrictive 
gun laws. Indeed, after 1986, the NRA propelled the wave of reform at the state level 
to make it easier to carry guns in public, including the replacement of discretionary 
permitting for concealed carry and lifting of prohibitions on guns in churches, bars, 
and college campuses. By adopting a political strategy rather than a legal one, the 
NRA not only changed the state of gun laws in the majority of states but also built 
up a large coalition of supportive lawmakers across the nation. As a result, the 
Aspirational Second Amendment has been adopted in most of America through leg-
islation, not judicial decision. 
The question for the future is whether the Aspirational Second Amendment, 
which so effectively shifted judicial doctrine in Heller, will eventually propel the 
courts to embrace an even more vibrant, gun-protective reading of the Second 
Amendment. Perhaps it will. Scholars have argued that the Supreme Court, rather 
than being a legal innovator on rights issues, often serves to stamp out outliers who 
fail to conform to a national consensus.50 At least one metric of a national consensus 
is state law, and the Aspirational Second Amendment has been adopted by the vast 
majority of states. Indeed, if President Donald Trump or any foreseeable Republican 
successor names the next few Justices to the Supreme Court, the Judicial Second 
Amendment might be transformed to look much more like the Aspirational Second 
Amendment in short order. The Judicial Second Amendment would become far more 
important, reshaping the law of the nine holdout states and perhaps even that of the 
federal government. 
The impact of such a revamping of state law is hard to estimate, given that gun 
laws often suffer from widespread noncompliance already. Like laws on recreational 
drugs, gun laws regulate small, easy to conceal items that people feel passionate 
about. As a result, many people knowingly disobey gun laws. After Sunnyvale, 
California, banned the possession of high-capacity magazines in 2013, police re-
ported that no magazines had been voluntarily turned in.51 That same year, New York 
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required the registration of assault weapons but only an estimated five percent of the 
firearms were registered.52 So it may be that many of the restrictive gun laws that 
might be called into question by the Aspirational Second Amendment are not being 
followed today anyway.  
Laws requiring a permit to carry a concealed firearm may be obeyed more often 
than magazine bans or registration requirements, in part because illegally carrying a 
gun in public is more likely to be enforced than a law targeting guns or magazine 
kept at home. Here, there are some numbers that give a hint of how adoption of the 
Aspirational Second Amendment would impact major cities in those nine states and 
D.C. Under its current discretionary permitting regime, Los Angeles County, with a 
population just over 10 million, has less than 400 civilians (other than law enforce-
ment) allowed to carry concealed weapons.53 In Aspirational Second Amendment 
states that make concealed carry permits readily available, about 4–6% of the popu-
lation obtains one.54 If that number held in Los Angeles, that would mean 400,000–
600,000 more residents authorized to carry. A similar explosion in carry permits 
would be expected in New York City, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Honolulu, 
Baltimore, and Trenton.   
While those numbers are alarming, they must be understood in the context of the 
Aspirational Second Amendment’s previous success. The gun rights movement has 
already revised state laws to allow easy concealed carry in many states, and plenty 
of major cities—Phoenix, Houston, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis—have large num-
bers of gun carriers. The social science data on the impact of permissive carry laws 
is inconclusive; many thoughtful and careful empirical studies have been done, some 
showing that they increase violence and others that they decrease violence.55 
Probably the best we can say at this point is that we do not know exactly what the 
impact is. Certainly, the worst fears of opponents of concealed carry, who warned of 
America becoming a new Wild West, have not materialized. In fact, crime in recent 
years has been historically low.56 And while that is not likely due to permissive carry 
laws, those laws have certainly not led to huge spikes in crime.  
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Nevertheless, if the Aspirational Second Amendment transforms the Judicial 
Second Amendment, and with it the laws of nine states, it would be an 
unprecedented feat for a constitutional right to bear arms provision. Over the 
course of American history, we have lived under the Second Amendment and 
dozens of similar state constitution guarantees. Rarely, however, have these 
provisions been read to broadly reshape the gun laws of even a single state. From 
time to time, courts have invalidated an important gun law, such as Georgia’s ban 
on concealable weapons in 184657 and Washington, D.C.’s ban on handguns in 
2008.58 Yet, one of the consistent themes in the constitutional history of the right 
to bear arms is that courts read such provisions narrowly to allow lawmakers 
considerable leeway to regulate guns in the interest of public safety. For the 
Supreme Court to read the Second Amendment to overhaul the gun laws of a 
significant portion of the country would be not just controversial but historic.  
In the end, however, the Aspirational Second Amendment seems destined to con-
tinue to dictate the gun laws in most of America, regardless of what happens with the 
Judicial Second Amendment. If there is an overarching lesson, it is that building a 
political movement around an aspirational vision of the Constitution can be more 
effective and durable than high-profile judicial victories. Constitutional values can 
often be, and in the case of the Second Amendment clearly are, best protected and 
preserved through political mobilization not the courts. 
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